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Abstract 
Nearly all modern software suffers from bloat that negatively 
impacts its performance and security. To combat this prob-
lem, several automated techniques have been proposed to 
debloat software. A key metric used in many of these works 
to demonstrate improved security is code reuse gadget count 
reduction. The use of this metric is based on the prevailing 
idea that reducing the number of gadgets available in a soft-
ware package reduces its attack surface and makes mounting 
a gadget-based code reuse exploit such as return-oriented 
programming (ROP) more difficult for an attacker. 
In this paper, we challenge this idea and show through a va-
riety of realistic debloating scenarios the flaws inherent to the 
gadget count reduction metric. Specifically, we demonstrate 
that software debloating can achieve high gadget count re-
duction rates, yet fail to limit an attacker’s ability to construct 
an exploit. Worse yet, in some scenarios high gadget count 
reduction rates conceal instances in which software debloat-
ing makes security worse by introducing new, useful gadgets. 
To address these issues, we propose a set of four new metrics 
for measuring security improvements realized through soft-
ware debloating that are quality-oriented rather than quantity-
oriented. We show that these metrics can identify when 
debloating negatively impacts security and be efficiently cal-
culated using our static binary analysis tool, the Gadget Set 
Analyzer. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of these metrics 
in two realistic case studies: iterative debloating and 
debloater evaluation. 
 
1. Introduction 
Software debloating [1-5, 20, 24-27] is an emerging field of 
research focused on improving software security and perfor-
mance by eliminating bloat that occurs as a byproduct of 
modern software engineering practices. While these practices 
enable the rapid development of complex, widely deployable, 
and feature-rich software, they produce software packages 
(programs, libraries, etc.) with large portions of code that are 
unnecessary in most end-use contexts. These portions of the 
package constitute software bloat and result in a variety of 
negative performance and security impacts [1, 6, 22, 23]. 
Software bloat affects virtually all software and primarily oc-
curs vertically in the software stack across layers of abstrac-
tion [1]. Programs that depend on common shared code 
libraries such as libc typically only require a small number 
of functions provided by the library, but load the entire library 
into the program’s memory space at runtime.  
Software bloat also occurs laterally within software packages 
suffering from feature creep [23]. Examples include software 
such as cUrl, which can be used to transfer data via 23 differ-
ent protocols, and iTunes, which features a media player, 
ecommerce platform, and hardware device interface within a 
single package. Since end users are unlikely to use every fea-
ture within these packages, the code associated with unused 
features contributes to software bloat. 
Recently, several software debloating techniques [2-5, 20, 
24-27] have been proposed that promise to improve software 
security by removing code bloat at various stages of the soft-
ware lifecycle. One frequently utilized metric for measuring 
security improvements realized via debloating is the reduc-
tion in total count of code reuse gadgets available to an at-
tacker, which we refer to as gadget count reduction. Several 
recent debloating publications [3-5, 24-27] claim their meth-
ods improve security citing gadget count reduction data as 
one form of evidence. 
The relationship between gadget count reduction and im-
proved security is based on the premise that reducing the total 
number of code reuse gadgets available in a software package 
reduces its attack surface. In turn, this decreases the likeli-
hood of an attacker successfully constructing a code reuse ex-
ploit using techniques such as return, jump, or call-oriented 
programming (also known as ROP, JOP, and COP [7-9, 21]). 
At face value, gadget count reduction is an appealing security 
improvement metric as it is easily generated using existing 
automated static analysis tools [14], is quantifiable, and is di-
rectly relevant to a class of cyberattacks that have been the 
focus of intense research over the last decade [7-15].  
The premise linking gadget count reduction to improved se-
curity holds only if the gadgets removed by debloating are 
critical to the construction of an exploit, and other gadgets 
with equivalent functionality are not available. For an at-
tacker attempting to construct a code reuse exploit, the total 
number of gadgets available is irrelevant; what truly matters 
is whether or not the gadgets necessary to express their de-
sired exploit and maintain malicious control flow are availa-
ble. Recent research on gadget chaining tools [10, 11] and 
code reuse attack techniques [12, 13] have shown that attack-
ers do not require a large, diverse, and fully expressive set of 
gadgets in order to craft an exploit. As a result, it is possible 
that debloating can achieve high gadget count reduction and 
indicate an improvement in security, yet fail to remove any 
of the gadgets an attacker needs to express and construct an 
exploit.  
Even worse, our research indicates that debloating techniques 
that remove code from a package introduce new gadgets at a 
high rate as a side effect. Gadget count reduction data does 
not capture instances where a gadget removed via debloating 
is replaced by a newly introduced gadget. Except in rare cases 
where the total count of gadgets is increased by debloating, 
this poorly understood side effect is masked by the metric. 
This opens the possibility that debloating may “successfully” 
reduce the overall count of gadgets, all while introducing 
new, useful gadgets that have a negative impact on security. 
1.1. Motivation 
Despite these flaws, gadget count reduction is widely used as 
a security improvement metric in recent literature [3-5, 24-
27] and has also been used a basis of comparison between 
two different debloating techniques [25]. We argue that the 
flaws inherent to this metric call into question claims of im-
proved security or superiority of one debloating technique 
over another in these works. Our motivation in this work is 
to bring attention to the issues surrounding the use of gadget 
count reduction as a security improvement metric and suggest 
an alternative set of measures to counter this practice. 
1.2. Paper Organization 
In section 3 of this paper, we first present the results of our 
study of gadget introduction as a side effect of code-remov-
ing debloaters. We analyze the root causes of gadget intro-
duction, and show that it is pervasive and occurs at a high rate 
using two different code-removing debloaters. 
In section 4 of this paper, we propose a set of four new met-
rics for measuring the security impact of software debloating: 
functional gadget set expressivity, functional gadget set qual-
ity, special purpose gadget availability, and gadget locality. 
These metrics overcome the shortcomings of gadget count re-
duction by assessing the utility of the gadgets available to the 
attacker rather than the quantity.  
In section 5, we demonstrate the practicality of these metrics 
by introducing our static binary analysis tool, Gadget Set An-
alyzer (GSA). GSA is capable of quickly and efficiently ana-
lyzing several program variants and calculating our proposed 
metrics in support of real-world debloating objectives. 
In section 6, we use GSA to highlight the shortcomings of 
gadget count reduction and show the value of our proposed 
metrics in realistic debloating scenarios. In each scenario, 
positive gadget count reduction is achieved; however, GSA 
and our proposed metrics reveal that a significant number of 
scenarios are negatively impacted by gadget introduction. 
Finally, in section 7 we demonstrate through two case studies 
that our metrics can be used to achieve meaningful security-
oriented goals. In the first case study, we use GSA to identify 
and mitigate the negative security impacts of debloating in 
one of our scenarios through iterative debloating. In the sec-
ond case study, we use GSA to conduct a side by side com-
parison of two debloating techniques and show that our met-
rics provide a more meaningful basis of comparison than 
gadget count reduction for determining which approach was 
more effective at improving security. 
2. Background 
In this section, we introduce necessary terms and review the 
current state of the art of relevant debloating techniques. 
2.1. Relevant Terms 
Code Reuse Attacks: Code reuse attacks are a class of attacks 
in which an attacker compromises the control flow of a pro-
gram and redirects execution to an existing executable part of 
the program to cause a malicious effect, bypassing code in-
jection defenses such as Write XOR Execute. In gadget-
based code reuse attack methods such as ROP, JOP, and COP 
[7-9, 21], the attacker chains together short instruction se-
quences called gadgets present in the program in a specific 
order to construct a malicious payload without injecting code. 
Gadget: A gadget suitable for use in a code reuse attack is a 
short sequence of machine instructions that end in a return, 
indirect jump, or indirect call instruction. Gadgets can be 
chained together using the control flow properties of the ter-
minating instruction to create a malicious payload comprised 
entirely of existing code segments. 
Gadget Types: When constructing a gadget chain, gadgets are 
used for one of two purposes. Functional gadgets are used as 
abstract instructions to express the attacker’s malicious in-
tent. Gadgets that can be used to perform important non-ex-
pressive actions such as invoking system calls or maintaining 
gadget chain control flow are called special purpose gadgets. 
ROP/JOP/COP Methods: In ROP [7], the attacker takes con-
trol of the stack and chains gadgets ending in return instruc-
tions together to create a malicious payload. The attacker 
maintains malicious control flow by exploiting the behavior 
of the stack to direct execution to the next gadget in the chain 
(triggered when the return instruction terminating the current 
gadget is executed).  
In JOP [8, 21], the attacker chains gadgets ending in uncon-
ditional jump or call instructions together to create a mali-
cious payload. This approach is not dependent on the stack 
and return instructions for control flow, and as such circum-
vents many ROP defenses. To initialize the attack and control 
the flow of execution from gadget to gadget, JOP relies on 
special purpose gadgets. A critical special purpose gadget, 
the dispatcher, maintains an ordered table of functional 
gadgets and ensures each functional gadget’s jump or call tar-
gets the dispatcher gadget after execution. 
COP [9] is a specialized variant of JOP, in which functional 
gadgets are limited to sequences ending in call instructions 
only. Gadget to gadget control flow in COP is accomplished 
using a dispatcher gadget similar to a JOP dispatcher, or 
through the use of other special purpose gadgets such as tram-
poline gadgets. 
2.2. Related Work: Code-removing Debloaters 
CHISEL: Lee et al. [3] recently proposed an automatic method 
for debloating unnecessary features from program source 
code called CHISEL. CHISEL takes as input a specification 
script that outputs whether or not a debloated variant satisfies 
the desired program properties. Using an iterative, feedback-
directed program reduction algorithm, CHISEL progressively 
removes segments of the program that are not necessary to 
satisfy the desired properties. 
This work cites gadget count reduction data as evidence of 
security improvement through attack surface reduction, but 
does not provide further analysis of the gadgets present in 
their debloated programs. CHISEL’s source code and bench-
marks have been made publicly available [16, 17]. 
TRIMMER: Sharif et al. [4] recently proposed an automated 
method for debloating unnecessary functionality from soft-
ware named TRIMMER. TRIMMER takes as input a static user 
defined configuration that expresses the deployment context 
for a particular program. Static configuration data is treated 
as a compile time constant and is propagated throughout the 
program. This is followed by custom, aggressive compiler 
optimizations to prune functionality from the program.  
The authors provide gadget count reduction data as evidence 
that TRIMMER reduces the attack surface of a program by re-
moving exploitable gadgets; However, they provide no ex-
planation of what makes a gadget exploitable as opposed to 
non-exploitable. Additionally, their data indicates that syscall 
gadgets were introduced as a result of debloating, yet no ex-
planation or investigation of this occurrence is provided. 
TRIMMER has not yet been made publicly available. 
CARVE:  Brown and Pande [20] recently proposed an auto-
mated feature debloating technique, named CARVE. CARVE 
requires users (software developers) enrich their source code 
with feature mappings that identify code related to one or 
more debloatable features. These mappings can optionally 
specify replacement code that prevents violation of high-
level security policies. CARVE takes the annotated source 
code and a debloating specification as input to a specialized 
source code pre-processor pass that scans the enriched source 
code for corresponding feature mappings. When found, 
CARVE performs syntax-aware analysis on the mapped code 
and intelligently removes it in a sound manner. The debloated 
source code is then compiled to produce a debloated binary 
using the same build process as the original version. CARVE 
has been made available by the original authors for use in this 
work. 
RAZOR: Qian and Hu et al. [25] recently proposed an auto-
mated feature debloating technique for binaries called RA-
ZOR. RAZOR takes as input a program binary and set of test 
cases that exercise desired functions, and performs a three- 
stage process that identifies desired code via dynamic tracing, 
uses heuristics-based analysis to identify additional function 
related code that was not exercised by the test cases, and syn-
thesizes a new debloated binary from the identified code. 
The authors use gadget count reduction data as one of two 
security improvement metrics (the other is known vulnerabil-
ity elimination) to show security improvements with their ap-
proach. Additionally, gadget count reduction data is used to 
directly compare the efficacy of RAZOR against that of 
CHISEL. This work does not provide further analysis of the 
gadgets present in their debloated programs or CHISEL’s pro-
grams. As of the writing of this paper, RAZOR has not yet 
been made publicly available.  
3. Gadget Introduction via Debloating  
Techniques such as CHISEL, TRIMMER, CARVE, and RAZOR 
that debloat by altering a software package’s representation 
(source code, intermediate representation, or binary) can in-
troduce new gadgets into the debloated variant in a manner 
that is difficult to predict. Since we do not have prior 
knowledge of which gadgets are useful to an attacker, gadget 
introduction can potentially offset security improvements re-
alized through debloating, or even make a debloated package 
less secure. We describe the root causes of gadget introduc-
tion in the following two sections. 
3.1. Introduction of Intended Gadgets 
During compilation, source code is translated to an interme-
diate representation and optimized before the resulting binary 
is created during code generation. Gadgets comprised of 
compiler generated binary instructions are referred to as in-
tended gadgets. In source code and compiler-based debloat-
ing techniques (CHISEL, TRIMMER, and CARVE), changes to 
package’s representation caused by debloating can cause 
downstream compiler stages to make different optimization 
and code generation decisions. Though RAZOR debloats 
packages in their binary format, it still causes significant 
changes to the package representation as a result of its binary 
re-synthetization approach. Regardless of the mechanism by 
which the binary instructions composing a software package 
are changed, the changes cause the introduction of new in-
tended gadgets. 
Consider the control flow graph (CFG) excerpts from lib-
curl shown in Figure 1. The excerpt on the left is from the  
Figure 1: Control flow graph snippets of curl_version. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
original version of the function curl_version, and the ex-
cerpt on the right shows the results of debloating eight lines 
from the corresponding source code. Binary instructions pre-
sent in both versions are in bold text, and the return instruc-
tion that forms ROP gadgets is in bold italicized text. Remov-
ing the source code results in fewer binary instructions as ex-
pected, however this shorter sequence of instructions has 
simpler control flow. Specifically, the jmp instruction on line 
19 and all but one instruction in the basic block following it 
are removed. As a result, all three basic blocks in the original 
version are merged into a single basic block in the debloated 
version. This change in control-flow increases the range of 
instructions the compiler can reorder to maximize perfor-
mance (lines 24-27 in the original version versus lines 1-11 
in the debloated version). Comparing the number of unique 
intended ROP gadgets produced by these two sequences, the 
net result is an increase in the gadget count. Two gadgets, 
[pop rbx; pop rbp; retn;] and [pop rbp; retn;], 
are present in both versions. One gadget is eliminated from 
the original version (lines 24-27), but two gadgets are intro-
duced in the debloated version (lines 7-11 and 8-11). 
In addition to instruction reordering, we have observed a 
number of other compiler operations that can be triggered by 
debloating (this is not an exhaustive list): 
• Eliminating branches (especially those close to an indirect 
branch or a procedure boundary) can alter control flow 
and introduce new gadgets.  
• Debloating entries in static arrays can trigger or prevent 
compile time optimizations for loops that iterate through 
these arrays. This has a significant effect on the code the 
compiler generates and the control-flow mechanisms used 
to implement the loop. 
• Inline function expansion can be triggered by debloating 
function call sites, altering control flow and potentially in-
troducing new gadgets. 
• Debloating can trigger dead code elimination across basic 
blocks, resulting in changes to control flow such as the 
merging of basic blocks that can introduce new gadgets. 
• Debloating can result in certain program variables becom-
ing statically determinable, triggering constant propaga-
tion optimizations. 
• Debloating can increase opportunities for code motion- 
based optimizations such partial redundancy elimination 
and loop invariant code motion. 
 
3.2. Introduction of Unintended Gadgets 
For ISAs with variable length instructions such as x86 and 
x86-64, it is possible to decode instructions from an offset 
other than the original instruction boundary to obtain new, 
potentially valid instruction sequences [7]. Code reuse gadg-
ets found in these sequences are referred to as unintended 
gadgets. When debloating alters compiler generated instruc-
tions, it also introduces new unintended gadgets when the al-
tered code is interpreted at unintended offsets. Even in simple 
cases where a small number of intended instructions are re-
moved, a significant number of new unintended gadgets are 
potentially introduced due to reinterpretation of code from 
unintended offsets. 
For example, consider the sequence of instructions taken 
from the last basic block of curl_version before debloat-
ing, shown in the top segment of Figure 2. Unintended gadg-
ets can be identified by interpreting the sequence at an offset 
of one byte and three bytes after the first instruction bound-
ary, shown in the bottom two segments of Figure 2. After 
debloating, the instructions in the final basic block (top seg-
ment of Figure 3) have changed significantly. In addition to 
altering the intended gadgets found in this basic block, 
debloating also changes the unintended gadgets found at var-
ious offsets from the original instruction boundary (bottom 
two segments of Figure 3). These unintended gadgets differ 
significantly from those found in the original sequence. The 
net result of this operation is the elimination of the unin-
tended gadgets in the original sequence and the introduction 
of the unintended gadgets in the resulting sequence. 
/* Previous Omitted */ 
1: cdqe 
2: sub rbp, rax 
3: add rbx, rax 
4: mov rsi, rbp 
5: mov rdi, rbx 
6: call Curl_http2_ver 
7: mov rsi, rbp 
8: movsxd rdi, eax 
9: lea r9, [rsp+0x6] 
10: lea rdx, [0x69EE2] 
11: sub rsi, rdi 
12: mov r8d, 0x3 
13: add rdi, rbx 
14: mov ecx, 0x2 
15: xor eax, eax 
16: mov [rsp+0x6], 0x0 
17: call curl_msnprintf 
18: mov [0x2841B1], 0x1 
19: jmp 0x2671F 
Before debloating  
curl_version() 
After debloating  
curl_version() 
/* Previous Omitted */ 
1: mov rsi, rbp 
2: movsxd rdi, eax 
3: sub rsi, rdi 
4: add rdi, rbx 
5: call Curl_http2_ver 
6: mov [0x2790F1], 0x1 
7: add rsp, 0x8 
8: lea rax,[0x279100] 
9: pop rbx 
10: pop rbp 
11: retn 
20: mov rdx, [rsp+0x8] 
21: xor rdx, [0x28] 
22: lea rax, [0x2814C0] 
23: jnz 
24: add rsp, 0x18 
25: pop rbx 
26: pop rbp 
27: retn 
Figure 2: Final basic block of curl_version before debloating, 
interpreted at three different byte offsets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Prevalence of Gadget Introduction 
To determine the degree to which software debloating intro-
duces new gadgets, we debloated a variety of common soft-
ware packages at varying levels of aggressiveness with two 
different code-removing debloaters. We analyzed each pack-
age and its variants using ROPgadget [14] to catalog its gadg-
ets by type, and then performed a set-wise comparison to 
identify gadgets present in the debloated variants that were 
not present in the original package. 
For this analysis we used CARVE and CHISEL, which were the 
only code-removing debloating tools available. We debloated 
four software packages with CARVE from the author provided 
benchmark set [20]: libmodbus v3.1.4, Bftpd v4.9, lib-
curl v7.61, and mongoose v.6.8. Each package was 
debloated at three levels of aggressiveness, defined below: 
• Conservative (C): Some peripheral features in the pack-
age are removed. 
• Moderate (M): Some peripheral features and some core 
features are removed from the package. 
• Aggressive (A): All debloatable features except for a 
small set of core features are removed from the package. 
These feature sets were selected to reflect reasonable real-
world use cases. Detailed feature set information for each 
scenario is included in Appendix A. 
We used CHISEL to debloat nine software packages from the 
author provided benchmark set [17]: bzip2 v1.05, chown 
v8.2, date v8.21, grep v2.19, gzip v1.2.4, mkdir v5.2.1, 
rm v8.4, tar v1.14, and uniq v8.16. We used the author 
provided specifications (roughly equivalent to the above def-
inition of aggressive debloating) to create debloated variants. 
Detailed information on these debloating specifications can 
found on the author’s benchmark repository [17]. 
All of the software packages and their debloated variants 
were built on the same platform, a virtual machine running 
the 64-bit Ubuntu 18.04.1 LTS. For consistency, we used the 
same compilers used by the original authors to build their  
Figure 3: Final basic block of curl_version after debloating, 
interpreted at three different byte offsets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
respective benchmarks: GCC version 7.3.0 for CARVE pack-
ages, and clang version 7.0.1 for CHISEL packages. 
Table 1 contains the results of our gadget count reduction and 
gadget introduction analysis. As shown in first column, 
debloating successfully reduced the total count of gadgets in 
all scenarios, and in most cases the total count is reduced by 
a large degree (>15%). 
The introduction of new gadgets via debloating is neither a 
rare nor limited occurrence. In all scenarios, a significant por-
tion of the functional gadgets remaining after debloating were 
introduced gadgets (35% was the smallest observed rate). In 
12 of 21 scenarios, introduced gadgets accounted for the ma-
jority of remaining gadgets. Further, gadget introduction oc-
curs at a significant rate across all gadget subcategories 
(ROP, JOP, COP), aggressiveness levels, benchmarks, and  
debloating tools.  
Significant levels of gadget introduction were also observed 
for special purpose gadgets (a value of N/A indicates that no 
gadgets of this type were present in the variant). In 14 of the 
21 scenarios, debloating resulted in the introduction of new 
special purpose gadgets. As was the case with functional 
gadgets, special purpose gadget introduction is not strongly 
correlated to debloating aggressiveness, gadget subcategory, 
benchmark type, or debloating tool used. 
The prevalence of gadget introduction has serious implica-
tions for the use of gadget count reduction as a security met-
ric. Our data strongly indicates that the gadgets present in a 
debloated variant will not be a proper subset of the gadgets in 
the original package, rendering metrics that capture only the 
change in size of a set insufficient and superficial. 
4. Gadget Utility Metrics 
In this section, we propose a set of four new metrics for as-
sessing the security impact of software debloating. Our  
48 83 c4 18: add rsp,0x18 
5b:          pop rbx 
5d:          pop rbp 
c3:          ret 
 
83 c4 18:    add esp,0x18 
5b:          pop rbx 
5d:          pop rbp 
c3:          ret 
 
18 5b 5d:    sbb BYTE PTR[rbx+0x5d],bl 
c3:          ret 
c6 05 0f 4d  
24 00 01:        mov BYTE PTR[rip+0x244d0f],0x1                     
48 83 c4 08:     add rsp,0x8 
48 8d 05 13  
4d 24 00:        lea rax,[rip+0x244d13] 
5b:              pop rbx 
5d:              pop rbp 
c3:              ret 
 
08 48 8d :       or BYTE PTR [rax-0x73],cl 
05 13 4d 24 00:  add eax,0x244d13 
5b:              pop rbx 
5d:              pop rbp 
c3:              ret 
 
13 4d 24:        adc ecx,DWORD PTR [rbp+0x24] 
00 5b 5d:        add BYTE PTR[rbx+0x5d],bl 
c3:              ret 
Table 1: Number and percentage of gadgets introduced by type in debloated software packages. 
 
  
Introduced Functional Gadgets Introduced Special Purpose (S.P.) Gadgets 
 Debloated 
Variant 
Gadget Count  
Reduction 
All  
Gadgets 
ROP  
Gadgets  
JOP  
Gadgets  
COP  
Gadgets 
System Call 
Gadgets 
JOP Specific 
S.P. Gadgets 
COP Specific 
S.P. Gadgets 
C
A
R
V
E
 
libmodbus (C) 89 (14%) 222 (39%) 149 (33%) 73 (60%) 33 (66%) N/A 2 (67%) N/A 
libmodbus (M) 108 (16%) 221 (40%) 163 (37%) 58 (55%) 35 (67%) N/A 0 (0%) N/A 
libmodbus (A) 143 (22%) 252 (49%) 156 (41%) 96 (73%) 44 (73%) N/A 0 (0%) N/A 
Bftpd (C) 40 ( 5%) 249 (35%) 202 (32%) 47 (61%) 20 (80%) N/A 0 (0%) N/A 
Bftpd (M) 124 (16%) 260 (41%) 197 (36%) 63 (74%) 44 (90%) N/A 0 (0%) N/A 
Bftpd (A) 220 (29%) 196 (37%) 167 (34%) 29 (62%) 14 (78%) N/A 0 (0%) N/A 
libcurl (C) 214 (2%) 4727 (51%) 1858 (45%) 2864 (56%) 2165 (52%) 5 (100%) 17 (30%) 305 (99%) 
libcurl (M) 1470 (15%) 4178 (52%) 1631 (44%) 2547 (58%) 2003 (56%) 0 (0%) 10 (23%) 287 (99%) 
libcurl (A) 3766 (40%) 3334 (58%) 1422 (49%) 1911 (68%) 1664 (69%) 4 (100%) 5 (26%) 171 (99%) 
Mongoose (C) 18 (2%) 412 (33%) 307 (29%) 105 (66%) 55 (78%) N/A 0 (0%) N/A 
Mongoose (M) 52 (4%) 396 (33%) 277 (27%) 119 (60%) 63 (80%) N/A 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 
Mongoose (A) 99 (8%) 405 (35%) 258 (27%) 147 (67%) 63 (80%) N/A 0 (0%) N/A 
C
H
IS
E
L  
bzip2 442 (65%) 152 (64%) 99 (59%) 53 (76%) 45 (75%) N/A 1 (100%) N/A 
chown 327 (65%) 94 (54%) 68 (47%) 26 (84%) 14 (87.5%) N/A 1 (100%) N/A 
date 260 (55%) 119 (56%) 89 (51%) 30 (77%) 23 (85%) N/A 1 (100%) N/A 
grep 378 (36%) 479 (72%) 380 (69%) 99 (87%) 79 (93%) N/A 1 (100%) N/A 
gzip 195 (46%) 156 (68%) 127 (65%) 29 (83%) 25 (86%) N/A 1 (100%) N/A 
mkdir 101 (48%) 47 (42%) 35 (38%) 12 (67%) 5 (83%) N/A 1 (100%) N/A 
rm 384 (72%) 77 (52%) 47 (41%) 30 (91%) 15 (88%) N/A 1 (100%) N/A 
tar 1355 (84%) 144 (57%) 75 (44%) 69 (86%) 52 (88%) N/A 2 (100%) N/A 
uniq 176 (59%) 53 (43%) 33 (34%) 20 (77%) 5 (71%) N/A 1 (100%) N/A 
metrics are designed to measure the degree to which debloat-
ing adversely affects the construction of gadget-based code 
reuse exploits by assessing the utility of the gadgets present 
after debloating as opposed to the quantity. Since functional 
gadgets and special purpose gadgets are utilized in different 
manners, we propose metrics suited for each gadget type. Ad-
ditionally, we propose a metric that addresses the residual 
utility of gadgets that are unaffected by debloating. 
4.1. Functional Gadget Set Expressivity 
Functional gadgets are used as abstract instructions that per-
form basic computational operations such as addition, regis-
ter loading, and logical branching to construct a malicious 
payload. The expressivity of a set of gadgets is a measure of 
the computational power the set of gadgets permit. 
The expressivity of a set of gadgets is typically measured 
against the bar of Turing-completeness. A set of gadgets is 
considered Turing-complete if it is sufficient to express any 
arbitrary program, i.e. it is computationally universal. While 
this level of expressivity is not difficult to achieve in practice 
[7-9, 12], it does not represent the minimum level necessary 
to construct a practical ROP exploit. Exploits that mark a re-
gion of memory as writable, inject malicious code, and redi-
rect execution to this injected code do not require Turing-
complete levels of expressivity [13].  
For a gadget set to achieve a certain level of expressivity, it 
must contain at least one gadget supporting each necessary 
computational class. Thus, a straightforward measure of the 
expressivity of a gadget set is the number of computational 
classes satisfied by the gadget set. For example, a gadget set 
that can be used for addition, register loading, and conditional 
branching is considered more expressive than one that sup-
ports only addition and register loading. 
If debloating removes all gadgets that perform a certain com-
putation, the number of satisfied classes decreases. As a re-
sult, an attacker may not be able to express their desired ex-
ploit. If debloating introduces gadgets that perform previ-
ously unavailable computations, the number of satisfied 
classes increases, indicating a negative security impact. 
4.2. Functional Gadget Set Quality 
When selecting a functional gadget to perform a particular 
computational task, the attacker prefers to use gadgets that 
perform the required task and nothing more.  However, given 
the nature of gadget-based code reuse attack methods and the 
unpredictable nature by which gadgets can be found in soft-
ware packages, this is not always possible. In order to per-
form a specific computational task such as moving a value 
into a specific general purpose register, the attacker may be 
forced to use a functional gadget that contains extraneous in-
structions. Such instructions may interfere with the overall 
exploit chain in a variety of ways (not an exhaustive list): 
• If an extraneous instruction writes to a memory location 
that is calculated at runtime, the gadget chain must en-
sure that the calculated memory location points to 
writeable memory or a chain-breaking segmentation 
fault may occur. 
• If an extraneous instruction performs a conditional 
branch, the gadget chain must ensure that the appropriate 
condition flag is set to ensure the desired branch is taken 
during exploit execution. 
• If an extraneous instruction stores a value in a register, 
the gadget chain must ensure this operation does not 
overwrite a necessary value placed in this register by a 
previous gadget in the chain. 
• If an extraneous instruction in a ROP gadget modifies the 
stack pointer register value this must be considered dur-
ing payload construction to ensure that the stack pointer 
points to the next gadget after executing the current one. 
• For JOP and COP gadgets, if an extraneous instruction 
overwrites the indirect jump/call target register, the 
gadget chain must ensure that the address of the next 
gadget or appropriate special purpose gadget is stored 
into the register, which may not be possible. 
Follner et al. [18] first proposed a gadget quality metric for 
scoring ROP gadgets according to the relative impact of these 
side effects. In their work, Follner et al. use this metric to as-
sess the impact of building software with support for MPX 
CPU extensions, however their scoring mechanism is suffi-
ciently general to apply to any software transformation, in-
cluding software debloating. For use in our work, we have 
extended the original scoring mechanism and tool implemen-
tation (called Gality) proposed by Follner et al. to account for 
side effects not originally considered in their work (the pres-
ence of conditional branches and non-static adjustments to 
the stack pointer value) and to score JOP and COP gadgets 
(their work focused on ROP gadgets only). 
The extended scoring method we use to calculate functional 
gadget set quality first eliminates gadgets that have side ef-
fects that make them impossible to use in a gadget chain. 
Next,  a score is assigned to each gadget indicating its quality. 
Scores are calculated by starting with a value of 0, increasing 
the score for each detected side effect. The higher the score, 
the more difficult the gadget is to use in an exploit chain. The 
gadget elimination criteria and a full list of side effects and 
their associated scores detected by our extended version of 
Gality are included in Appendix B. 
To determine the impact of debloating on functional gadget 
set quality, we examine the number of useful gadgets (i.e. 
gadgets not eliminated by the scoring method) and the aver-
age quality score of the useful gadgets. If debloating elimi-
nates all of the useful gadgets or causes a significant increase 
in the average gadget quality score for a particular attack 
method (ROP/JOP/COP), then a positive security impact has 
been achieved. If debloating causes a significant decrease in 
the average gadget quality score, this indicates a negative se-
curity impact. 
4.3. Special Purpose Gadget Availability 
Special purpose gadgets are used to perform important non-
expressive actions in an exploit gadget chain. These gadgets 
must meet specific criteria, and are typically encountered in-
frequently. Without special purpose gadgets, some exploits 
are not possible. For example, JOP/COP exploits do not use 
the stack, and instead rely on special purpose gadgets such as 
dispatchers and trampolines to maintain control flow from 
one gadget to the next. Also, exploits that must invoke system 
calls require special purpose gadgets.  
Given their importance, the availability of special purpose 
gadgets is a useful metric for determining if debloating has 
reduced the types of exploits an attacker can construct. The 
availability of special purpose gadgets can be measured by 
maintaining counts of each type of special purpose gadget. If 
a debloating operation removes all of the special purpose 
gadgets of a particular type, then the attacker may not be able 
to construct their desired exploit. This metric is also capable 
of detecting the negative side effects of gadget introduction. 
If debloating introduces new special purpose gadgets of a par-
ticular type, this increase in availability is observable. 
4.4. Gadget Locality 
Code-reuse attacks are complex and require significant effort 
on the attacker’s part to construct. The attacker must first dis-
cover a suitable attack vector (typically an exploitable 
memory corruption vulnerability) on the target system, obtain 
a copy of vulnerable binary, scan it for gadgets, and use those 
gadgets to construct their exploit. The final output of this re-
source intensive process is a malicious payload that consists 
of an ordered chain of offsets where the necessary gadgets are 
located in the vulnerable binary and any required data. De-
spite the high effort required to construct these exploits, they 
are fragile. If the gadgets in the exploit chain have been mod-
ified or have been moved to a new offset by a software update 
or patch, then the exploit is very likely to fail. As a result, 
code reuse exploits are typically not portable from one vari-
ant of a software package to the next. Attackers rely on soft-
ware homogeneity to target multiple systems with the same 
code reuse exploit; if they encounter a variant of a target pro-
gram they must start the exploitation process anew. 
Software debloating prevents the attacker from utilizing 
gadgets present in bloat code, however it can also have a 
scrambling effect on the resulting debloated binary that relo-
cates or alters gadgets that are not removed (or introduced). 
This effect increases software diversity, especially for fea-
ture-removing debloaters that are end user driven, as opposed 
to techniques that are focused on removing unreachable li-
brary code [5, 26, 27] which cannot be used to produce a large 
number of package variants. Increasing software diversity 
improves security as a form of moving target defense. Spe-
cifically, if an attacker develops a code reuse exploit for a 
software package, the exploit is not likely to be portable to a 
debloated version of that package if the debloating process 
removed, altered, or relocated a sufficiently large percentage 
of the gadgets present in the binary. To exploit the debloated 
variant, the attacker would need to acquire the debloated 
binary, discover its gadgets, and attempt to rewrite and re-
package their exploit. 
We define the gadget locality of a debloated package variant 
as the percentage of gadgets remaining after debloating that 
have not been altered and can be found at the same offset as 
the original package. If debloating a package results in 0% 
gadget locality, then a code reuse exploit using gadgets found 
in the original package cannot be readily used to exploit the 
debloated version. If debloating results in 100% gadget local-
ity, then an exploit targeting the original package can be used 
against the debloated version provided the exploit chain does 
not contain a gadget removed during debloating. 
4.5. Discussion of Metrics 
We do not claim that these metrics are comprehensive. We 
encourage further discussion that will lead to the exploration 
of additional useful security-oriented metrics for debloating. 
Other measures of gadget utility with respect to specific at-
tack methods (code injection via a ROP chain invoking Vir-
tualProtect on Windows 7 x64 systems) have been ex-
plored by Follner et al. [18], which are potentially applicable 
to the problem of measuring the security impact of debloating 
in less generalized contexts. 
5. Gadget Set Analyzer (GSA) 
To assess the practicality of our metrics, we created a static 
binary analysis tool capable of analyzing a software package 
and its debloated variants to capture changes in functional 
gadget expressivity and special purpose gadget availability.  
5.1. Operation 
GSA operates in a straightforward manner and makes use of 
existing tools where possible. GSA takes as input the original 
package binary and one or more debloated variants. First, 
GSA uses ROPgadget [14] to search each binary for unique 
ROP, JOP and Syscall gadgets. GSA then performs second-
ary search of these results to identify unique COP gadgets and 
JOP/COP specific special purpose gadgets. 
Once GSA has compiled completed its secondary search, it 
runs our extended version of Gality on the gadgets found in 
each package variant to calculate the number of useful gadg-
ets, individual quality scores for these gadgets, and the aver-
age quality score across the set of useful gadgets. 
Next, GSA utilizes a tool first proposed and implemented by 
Homescu et al. [12] for classifying short ROP gadgets (called 
microgadgets) into computational classes. This microgadget 
scanner then determines the expressive power of the gadget 
set relative to different levels of expressivity by analyzing the 
number of computational classes satisfied. GSA uses this 
scanner to analyze the gadget set with respect to three levels 
of expressivity originally proposed in [12]: simple Turing-
completeness, expressivity required for practical ROP ex-
ploits, and expressivity required for practical, ASLR-proof 
ROP exploits. Each level requires a different number of com-
putational classes be satisfied by at least one gadget: 17 for 
simple Turing-completeness, 11 for practical ROP exploits, 
and 35 for ASLR-proof, practical ROP exploits. 
After detecting special purpose gadgets and collecting func-
tional gadget set quality and expressivity data, GSA com-
pares the data for each debloated variant against the data col-
lected on the original binary to calculate changes in func-
tional gadget set expressivity, functional gadget set quality, 
and special purpose gadget availability. Finally, GSA at-
tempts to match the location and content of each gadget pre-
sent in the debloated binary to one of the gadgets in the orig-
inal binary.  Successful matches are recorded and used to cal-
culate gadget locality. 
GSA also provides a means for the user to address gadgets 
introduced by debloating. Using the binary analysis library 
angr [19], GSA attempts to identify the names of functions 
containing introduced gadgets. This information can be used 
to identify the source of an undesirable debloating operation, 
potentially allowing the user alter their debloating specifica-
tion to generate a new variant that does not introduce the 
gadget. GSA provides this as a “best effort” feature, and can-
not guarantee that a function name can be retrieved. This is 
due to several factors including imprecision associated with 
generating a CFG in angr and the mechanism by which the 
gadget was introduced. 
5.2. Limitations 
GSA’s calculation of functional gadget set expressivity has 
the same limitations as the gadget expressivity scanner it in-
corporates. Specifically, the microgadget scanner used by 
GSA generates functional gadget expressivity data based 
solely on an analysis of short gadgets in the set. As a result, a 
gadget set may be more expressive than reported by GSA if 
longer gadgets excluded from analysis can satisfy additional 
computational classes. Also, the microgadget scanner only 
calculates the expressivity of ROP gadget sets, and does not 
calculate expressivity for JOP or COP gadget sets. 
Additionally, dynamically linked external libraries are not 
scanned by GSA. At runtime, these libraries are loaded into 
memory and their code is mapped to the package’s address 
space. Gadgets present in these libraries contribute to overall 
expressivity and special purpose gadget availability, and also 
should be considered for a holistic view. 
5.3. Performance 
GSA and its dependencies perform binary analysis exclu-
sively with static techniques. As such, the time required to 
run GSA increases with the size of the binary. GSA is perfor-
mant, typically requiring less than 30 seconds to analyze a 
binary and three variants on a typical laptop. The maximum 
time required to execute GSA we observed was 2 minutes and  
Table 2: Computational Classes Satisfied (and Reduction) by Gadget Set for Three Functional Expressivity Levels. 
CARVE CHISEL 
Package 
Variant 
Practical ROP 
Exploit Classes 
ASLR-Proof 
ROP Classes 
Simple Turing 
Complete Classes 
Package 
Variant 
Practical ROP 
Exploit Classes 
ASLR-Proof 
ROP Classes 
Simple Turing 
Complete Classes 
libmodbus (C) 6 of 11 (0) 10 of 35 (3) 6 of 17 (1) bzip2 3 of 11 (2) 5 of 35 (2) 1 of 17 (2) 
libmodbus (M) 6 of 11 (0) 13 of 35 (0) 7 of 17 (0) chown 3 of 11 (0) 5 of 35 (4) 2 of 17 (2) 
libmodbus (A) 6 of 11 (0) 13 of 35 (0) 7 of 17 (0) date 3 of 11 (2) 5 of 35 (4) 2 of 17 (2) 
Bftpd (C) 7 of 11 (-1) 12 of 35 (3) 6 of 17 (1) grep 3 of 11 (2) 6 of 35 (5) 2 of 17 (5) 
Bftpd (M) 7 of 11 (-1) 17 of 35 (-2) 6 of 17 (1) gzip 3 of 11 (2) 5 of 35 (1) 1 of 17 (2) 
Bftpd (A) 6 of 11 (0) 11 of 35 (4) 5 of 17 (2) mkdir 3 of 11 (0) 6 of 35 (0) 1 of 17 (1) 
libcurl (C) 9 of 11 (0) 26 of 35 (-1) 11 of 17 (-1) rm 3 of 11 (0) 5 of 35 (4) 2 of 17 (2) 
libcurl (M) 9 of 11 (0) 24 of 35 (1) 10 of 17 (0) tar 3 of 11 (2) 5 of 35 (4) 1 of 17 (4) 
libcurl (A) 10 of 11 (-1) 24 of 35 (1) 10 of 17 (0) uniq 3 of 11 (0) 5 of 35 (4) 1 of 17 (3) 
Mongoose (C) 7 of 11 (0) 10 of 35 (6) 8 of 17 (0)     
Mongoose (M) 7 of 11 (0) 10 of 35 (6) 8 of 17 (0)     
Mongoose (A) 7 of 11 (0) 10 of 35 (6) 8 of 17 (0)     
 
33 seconds, which occurred when analyzing libcurl and its 
three debloated variants.  
The most time-consuming component of GSA is its gadget 
source identification feature, which requires recovering the 
binary’s CFG with angr. This feature can be optionally disa-
bled, significantly reducing the time required by GSA. When 
this feature is disabled, GSA is able to analyze libcurl and 
its three debloated variants in less than 40 seconds. 
6. Results 
In this section, we present the results generated by GSA 
across our debloating scenarios. Our results demonstrate both 
the utility of our proposed metrics and the shortcomings of 
gadget count reduction.  
6.1. Functional Gadget Set Expressivity 
Table 2 contains functional gadget set expressivity data col-
lected by GSA. Debloating was generally successful in re-
ducing expressivity when used aggressively on simple soft-
ware packages (CHISEL benchmarks). However, this was not 
the case in the larger, more complex packages and less ag-
gressive debloating scenarios (CARVE benchmarks). 
In two scenarios, debloating reduced the gadget count but did 
not decrease gadget set expressivity (italicized text). In these 
cases, gadget count reduction indicates a positive security im-
pact, but the actual impact on security is neutral. Of greater 
concern are the four scenarios in which debloating increased 
in gadget set expressivity (bold text) by introducing new 
gadgets that satisfied previously unsatisfied computational 
classes. In all four scenarios, using gadget count reduction as 
a security metric indicates positive results, but fails to iden-
tify this negative security impact. 
6.2. Functional Gadget Set Quality 
Table 3 contains the functional gadget set quality data col-
lected by GSA. Results according to this metric are also con-
cerning. In general, debloating succeeded in reducing the 
number of quality gadgets in with respect to each attack 
method (ROP / JOP / COP); we observed an increase in 
quality gadgets for at least one attack method in only 3 of the 
21 debloating scenarios. 
However, debloating generally did not succeed at signifi-
cantly reducing the average quality score of the quality gadg-
ets identified within each package binary. We observed only 
two scenarios in which debloating resulted in a positive re-
sult, which we define as a significant decrease in average 
quality with respect to at least one attack type, and no signif-
icant increases in quality (an increase is considered signifi-
cant if its magnitude is 0.1 or larger). Conversely, we ob-
served a negative result in more than half of scenarios (11 of 
21), defined as a significant increase in average quality with 
respect to at least one attack type (bold text in Table 3), and 
no significant decreases in quality. In fact, we observed two 
scenarios in which debloating had decidedly negative results, 
indicated by a significant increase in average gadget quality 
with respect to all three attack types. Once again, gadget 
count reduction fails to capture these negative impacts. 
6.3. Special Purpose Gadget Availability 
Table 4 contains special purpose gadget availability data col-
lected by GSA. The results measured according to this metric 
were similarly mixed. A conclusively positive result (com-
plete elimination of all special purpose gadgets of some type) 
was observed in only 8 of 21 debloating scenarios. In eight 
other scenarios, debloating did not reduce the availability of 
special purpose gadgets (italicized text). In four scenarios, 
gadget introduction caused an increase in the count of special 
purpose gadgets (bold text). In one instance, debloating intro-
duced a special purpose gadget of a type that was not availa-
ble in the original package, a conclusively negative result. As 
was the case with functional gadget set expressivity and func-
tional gadget set quality, measuring special purpose gadget 
availability captured mixed and negative debloating results 
that were not observable using gadget count reduction data. 
6.4. Gadget Locality 
The results measured according to this metric were conclu-
sively positive for all benchmarks. In all but two scenarios, 
debloating (and subsequent re-compilation) caused a change  
Table 3: Quality Gadget Counts and Average Quality Score (and Reduction) by Attack Method (ROP / JOP / COP). 
 
Debloated 
Variant 
Quality ROP 
Gadgets 
Average ROP 
Gadget Quality 
Quality JOP 
Gadgets 
Average JOP 
Gadget Quality 
Quality COP 
Gadgets 
Average COP 
Gadget Quality 
C
A
R
V
E
 
libmodbus (C) 228 (61) 0.81 (0.10) 45 (1) 1.13 (0.13) 22 (0) 0.36 (0.5) 
libmodbus (M) 231 (58) 0.86 (0.05) 62 (-16) 1.21 (0.05) 23 (-1) 0.71 (0.15) 
libmodbus (A) 205 (84) 0.76 (0.14) 61 (-15) 0.99 (0.27) 30 (-8) 0.62 (0.25) 
Bftpd (C) 246 (16) 0.96 (-0.02) 31 (13) 0.79 (-0.09) 12 (12) 0.88 (-0.21) 
Bftpd (M) 227 (35) 0.93 (0.01) 31 (16) 0.58 (0.12) 22 (2) 0.59 (0.08) 
Bftpd (A) 197 (65) 0.91 (0.03) 13 (34) 0.50 (0.20) 8 (16) 0.57 (0.10) 
libcurl (C) 1800 (25) 0.86 (0.00) 2978 (89) 0.60 (-0.01) 2420 (91) 0.52 (-0.02) 
libcurl (M) 1619 (206) 0.85 (0.01) 2492 (575) 0.58 (0.02) 2043 (468) 0.48 (0.02) 
libcurl (A) 1331 (494) 0.84 (0.03) 1668 (1399) 0.57 (0.02) 1420 (1091) 0.48 (0.03) 
Mongoose (C) 436 (8) 1.07 (0.02) 99 (11) 0.79 (0.08) 37 (12) 0.51 (0.29) 
Mongoose (M) 422 (22) 1.07 (0.02) 95 (15) 0.91 (-0.04) 37 (12) 0.96 (-0.15) 
Mongoose (A) 400 (44) 1.05 (0.03) 119 (-9) 0.82 (0.05) 44 (5) 0.81 (0.00) 
C
H
IS
E
L 
bzip2 96 (55) 1.30 (-0.20) 41 (23) 0.29 (0.39) 36 (11) 0.26 (0.43) 
chown 99 (124) 1.35 (-0.01) 12 (49) 0.29 (0.38) 7 (25) 0.36 (0.27) 
date 100 (120) 1.01 (0.14) 21 (8) 0.69 (-0.38) 16 (-3) 0.81 (-0.54) 
grep 277 (106) 1.13 (0.17) 61 (87) 0.75 (-0.01) 48 (66) 0.63 (0.08) 
gzip 90 (75) 1.13 (0.00) 15 (15) 0.5 (0.05) 13 (6) 0.54 (0.04) 
mkdir 66 (46) 1.10 (0.05) 6 (6) 0.08 (0.46) 3 (0) 0.00 (0.00) 
rm 72 (155) 1.23 (0.11) 13 (45) 0.58 (-0.09) 8 (37) 0.63 (-0.04) 
tar 123 (298) 1.15 (0.44) 39 (303) 0.85 (-0.08) 28 (253) 0.64 (0.07) 
uniq 66 (78) 1.23 (0.04) 9 (4) 0.39 (0.00) 2 (8) 0.0 (0.45) 
Table 4: Special Purpose Gadget Counts (and Reduction) by Gadget Set (excludes types not observed in any variant). 
 Package 
Variant 
Syscall 
Gadget 
JOP Dispatcher 
Gadgets 
JOP Data  
Loader Gadgets 
JOP Trampoline 
Gadgets 
COP Dispatcher 
Gadgets 
COP Intra Stack 
Pivot Gadgets 
C
A
R
V
E
 
libmodbus (C) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (-2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
libmodbus (M) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
libmodbus (A) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Bftpd (C) 0 (0) 0 (0) 9 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Bftpd (M) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (9) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Bftpd (A) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (9) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
libcurl (C) 5 (-1) 7 (1) 50 (1) 0 (1) 304 (15) 4 (0) 
libcurl (M) 0 (4) 4 (4) 41 (10) 0 (1) 287 (32) 3 (1) 
libcurl (A) 4 (0) 3 (5) 14 (37) 1 (0) 170 (149) 2 (2) 
Mongoose (C) 0 (0) 1 (-1) 6 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Mongoose (M) 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Mongoose (A) 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
C
H
IS
E
L 
bzip2 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
chown 0 (4) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
date 0 (4) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
grep 0 (4) 0 (0) 1 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
gzip 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
mkdir 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
rm 0 (4) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
tar 0 (2) 0 (0) 2 (-1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
uniq 0 (4) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
in the component instructions and/or the offset within the bi-
nary for every gadget, resulting in 0% gadget locality. In the 
two scenarios in which we observed local gadgets, conserva-
tive debloating of libmodbus and Mongoose, the number of 
local gadgets after debloating was very small (three and five 
gadgets respectively). In both cases, the number of local 
gadgets accounted for 0.5% or less of the total remaining 
gadgets. Such a clear positive result is encouraging, and not 
readily apparent from gadget count reduction data. 
These results indicate that source code-based debloating 
methods are very effective at producing variants that are 
resistant to exploit re-use, even when debloating is conserva-
tive in nature. Other code-removing tools that operate at 
lower levels program representation (e.g. TRIMMER and RA-
ZOR) are likely to see similar benefits, however the specific 
technical methods may lend themselves to producing 
debloated variants with higher gadget locality. Methods that 
utilize binary rewriting as opposed to code removal to debloat 
(e.g. TOSS, Piece-wise compilation/loading, and BINTRIM-
MER [2, 5, 27]) intentionally avoid disturbing the binary rep-
resentation of the program to avoid recalculation of pointers 
and offsets. We expect that these methods would exhibit high 
gadget locality values. We leave the task of comparing gadget 
locality data between different debloating techniques to fu-
ture work. 
7. Case Studies 
In this section, we demonstrate through two case studies that 
our metrics can be used to achieve meaningful security-ori-
ented goals. First, we use GSA to mitigate unexpected nega-
tive side effects that occurred when conservatively debloat-
ing libcurl. We use a process which we call iterative 
debloating to use information reported by GSA to help adjust 
our debloating specification to generate a new variant that 
debloats fewer features, but does not suffer the negative ef-
fects identified in the first debloating round. In the second 
case study, we use GSA to conduct a side by side comparison 
of CARVE and CHISEL to determine which was more effective 
at debloating chown v8.2. We use both the gadget count re-
duction metric, as well as our proposed metrics to show they 
provide a more meaningful comparison. 
7.1. Case Study 1: Iterative Debloating 
We observed a number of negative security impacts when 
conservatively debloating libcurl: 
• Increased the gadget set expressivity with respect to 
ASLR-Proof practical ROP exploits 
• Increased the gadget set expressivity with respect to sim-
ple Turing-completeness 
• Increased the number of system call gadgets 
In order to mitigate these effects, we attempted to find a less 
aggressive debloating configuration that does not suffer these 
negative side effects. In this scenario, GSA was not able to 
identify the containing function for the newly introduced 
gadgets. In the absence of this information, we used alternate 
heuristics to decide what adjustments to make to mitigate the 
negative effects. We observed the effects debloating different 
sets of features had on other variants of libcurl; These neg-
ative effects were not observed in both the aggressive and 
moderate debloating scenarios. By analyzing the feature sets 
selected for each variant, we determined that a second de-
bloating attempt for libcurl (C) was likely to yield better 
results if we did not debloat support for two protocol families, 
SCP and RTSP. 
We made this modification to the debloating specification, 
re-ran CARVE, built the new variant, and analyzed the new 
variant with GSA. The results were largely an improvement, 
as expected:  
• Reduced gadget set expressivity with respect to ASLR-
proof practical ROP exploits 
• No change in gadget set expressivity with respect to sim-
ple Turing-completeness 
• Decreased the number of system call gadgets 
However, changing the debloating configuration did result in 
one negative impact. In the new variant, we observed an in-
crease in the number of COP intra stack pivot gadgets by one 
gadget. While this is not an ideal result, we determined that it 
did not offset the improvements realized in this second round 
of debloating. We manually analyzed the newly introduced 
gadget and determined that it was functionally identical to 
another such gadget included in both the original package and 
our newly created variant; therefore, the newly introduced 
gadget does not significantly assist a hypothetical attacker. 
7.2. Case Study 2: Comparing Debloating Tools 
With a wide variety of debloating methods being presented 
in the literature, it is becoming more important to have useful 
metrics to meaningfully compare techniques to one another. 
To demonstrate that our proposed gadget-based metrics can 
be used to accomplish this, we used CARVE to debloat one of 
CHISEL’s benchmark software packages, chown v8.2. We 
used the same specification for that was originally used by 
CHISEL’s authors, which specifies the following features for 
debloating: 
• Recursive Operations Options: traverse symbolic link 
from CLI (-H), traverse all symbolic links (-L), and do 
not traverse symbolic links (-P) 
• Output Options: verbose reporting (-v), report changes 
only (-c), and suppress most output (-f) 
We scanned the original binary and both debloated binaries 
with GSA and analyzed the results, which are displayed in 
Table 5. CHISEL achieved much higher gadget reduction 
(65.1% versus 25.7%) than CARVE, however our metrics tell 
a different and more complete story.  
In each column of Table 5, the values of the debloating tech-
nique that performed better are in bold text. With respect to 
functional gadget set expressivity, CHISEL outperformed 
CARVE. CHISEL reduced the expressivity of the gadget with 
respect to two expressivity levels, while CARVE increased ex-
pressivity with respect to two levels. With respect to gadget 
quality, CHISEL was more effective than CARVE at eliminat-
ing quality ROP gadgets and reducing the average quality of 
ROP gadgets. However, CARVE outperformed CHISEL by a 
wide margin with respect to JOP and COP gadgets, reducing 
a larger number of quality gadgets and greatly reducing the 
average quality of the remaining gadgets. Chisel, on the other 
hand, did reduce the numbers of quality JOP and COP gadg-
ets, but ended up increasing the average quality rather than 
reducing it.  
Both techniques had identical results with respect to the avail-
ability of Special Purpose gadgets. CARVE and CHISEL both 
eliminated the four system call gadgets present in the original 
binary and left a single JOP Data Loader remaining. Also, 
both techniques achieved 0% gadget locality.  
Table 5: Comparing the Effectiveness of Debloating chown v8.2 with CHISEL and CARVE. 
  Functional Gadget Set Expressivity Functional Gadget Set Quality 
  
Package 
Variant 
Total 
Gadgets  
Practical 
ROP  
Exploit 
Classes 
ASLR-Proof 
ROP  
Classes  
Simple 
Turing 
Complete 
Classes  
Quality ROP 
Gadgets  
Average ROP 
Quality 
Quality JOP 
Gadgets 
Average JOP  
Quality 
Quality COP 
Gadgets 
Average COP 
Quality 
S.P. Gadget  
Categories 
Available  
Gadget 
Locality 
Original 502 3 of 11 9 of 35 4 of 17 223  1.33 
61 
0.67 
32 
0.63 2 of 10 N/A 
CHISEL 175 (65.1%) 3 of 11 (0) 5 of 35 (4) 2 of 17 (2) 
99 (124)  
1.34 (-0.01) 
12 (49) 
0.29 (0.38) 
7 (25) 
0.357 (0.26) 1 of 10 (1) 0.0% 
CARVE 373 (25.7%) 5 of 11 (-2) 13 of 35 (-4) 4 of 17 (0) 
132 (91) 
0.92 (0.4) 
7 (54) 
1.85 (-1.19) 
6 (26) 
2.12 (-1.54) 1 of 10 (1) 0.0% 
Judging by gadget count reduction alone, CHISEL outper-
formed CARVE at this task by a wide margin. By contrast, our 
metrics reveal that CHISEL only clearly outperformed CARVE 
in one dimension. Further, CARVE was more successful at re-
ducing the number of useful JOP and COP gadgets and their 
average quality, and performed equally well with respect to 
our other metrics. This disparity is further evidence of the in-
herent problems with gadget count reduction as a software 
debloating metric. 
7.3. Discussion 
Our case studies highlight several important consequences of 
the unpredictable nature of gadget introduction worthy of fur-
ther discussion. First, it may not be possible to debloat pack-
ages with code-removing debloaters without incurring some 
negative impacts. Good security-oriented metrics should 
highlight these impacts and support the user in making in-
formed tradeoffs when debloating, including choosing not to 
debloat.  
Second, debloating does not have a linear relationship with 
security improvement. Techniques that debloat a larger por-
tion of a package are not necessarily more effective at im-
proving security than those that debloat less. Research into 
code-removing debloating techniques and tools should con-
sider the problem of debloating in manner that minimizes or 
mitigates the negative side effects of gadget introduction. 
8. Future Work 
We have identified several areas worthy of future explora-
tion. First, our proposed metrics are intended to generate dis-
cussion and research into other viable security-oriented met-
rics for software debloating, such as measures specific to par-
ticular exploit subtypes. Additionally, there is a need for new 
analysis tools that calculate gadget set expressivity data. Im-
mediate needs raised by this work include gadget set expres-
sivity analysis for JOP and COP gadgets, as well as expres-
sivity analysis for arbitrary length gadgets. Finally, we intend 
to extend GSA with an optional feature to automatically ana-
lyze a variant’s dynamically linked libraries. 
9. Conclusion 
We presented examples across a variety of debloating scenar-
ios demonstrating the flaws inherent to the gadget count re-
duction metric. Despite achieving sizeable gadget count re-
ductions, our scenarios revealed that debloating can introduce 
new gadgets, including gadgets of high value like special pur-
pose gadgets. We proposed four new security-oriented met-
rics, functional gadget set expressivity, functional gadget set 
quality, special purpose gadget availability, and gadget local-
ity to replace the gadget count reduction metric. We demon-
strated that these metrics overcome the limitations of gadget 
count reduction by identifying when the side effects of 
debloating negatively impact security. Finally, we showed 
the practicality of these metrics by introducing our tool for 
calculating these metrics, GSA, and using it in two realistic 
case studies. 
Technical Artifact Availability 
GSA, the tools it depends on (extended version of Gality and 
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https://github.com/michaelbrownuc/gality 
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A. Appendix – Mapped Features for CARVE Benchmarks  
The following tables detail which features were mapped for each benchmark, and which were debloated in each scenario. For 
brevity, the complete list of fine-grained debloatable features in the package are condensed into the categories in the leftmost 
column. Features removed by CARVE are marked with an X in that scenario’s column.  
Table A.1: Debloated features per scenario for libmodbus. 
Debloatable  
Feature 
Conservative 
Scenario 
Moderate 
Scenario 
Aggressive 
Scenario 
RTU Read  
Operations X   X 
RTU Write  
Operations X 
 X 
RTU Raw  
Operations X   X 
TCP (IPv4) Read  
Operations 
 X X 
TCP (IPv4) Write  
Operations 
 X X 
TCP (IPv4) Raw  
Operations 
 X X 
TCP (IPv4/6) Read  
Operations   X   
TCP (IPv4/6) Write  
Operations   X X 
TCP (IPv4/6) Raw  
Operations   X X 
 
Table A.2: Debloated features per scenario for Bftpd. 
Debloatable  
Feature 
Conservative 
Scenario 
Moderate 
Scenario 
Aggressive 
Scenario 
Admin Commands X X X 
Read Commands       
Write Commands     X 
Directory  
Commands   X X 
Server Config  
Commands   X X 
Miscellaneous  
Commands   X X 
Server Info  
Commands     X 
 
 
 
Table A.3: Debloated features per scenario for libcurl. 
Debloatable  
Feature 
Conservative 
Scenario 
Moderate 
Scenario 
Aggressive 
Scenario 
Uncommon  
API Elements X X X 
HTTP     X 
HTTPS     X 
RTSP X X X 
FTP Read Commands    X 
FTP Write Commands  X X 
FTPS  X X 
Telnet X X X 
LDAP  X X 
TFTP X X   
IMAP   X X 
SMB   X X 
SMTP   X X 
POP3   X X 
RTMP X X X 
File X X X 
Gopher X X X 
Dict X X X 
SCP X X X 
SFTP   X X 
Table A.4: Debloated features per scenario for mongoose. 
Debloatable  
Feature 
Conservative 
Scenario 
Moderate 
Scenario 
Aggressive 
Scenario 
Threads API     X 
Broadcast API X     
IPV6 X   X 
COAP     X 
DNS  X X 
HTTP Server       
HTP CGI X     
Websocket      
HTTP Client     X 
Websocket       
MQTT    X 
SNTP X   X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
B. Appendix – Gality (Extended Version) Gadget Elimination Criteria and Side Effect Scoring 
 
Table B.1: Gality (Extended Version) Gadget Elimination Criteria. 
Attack Category Elimination Criteria Description 
ROP The gadget contains a non-static assignment to the stack pointer register. 
ROP The gadget contains a large (>16 bytes) or unaligned (%4) offset. 
Syscall The gadget is not ROP / JOP / specific (currently this means it is a system call gadget). 
JOP / COP The gadget ends with direct jump. Occurs due to a bug in ROPgadget. 
JOP / COP The indirect jump / call target register is derefenced and modified by an offset. 
ROP / JOP / COP The first instruction in the gadget is not within the class of useful gadgets.  (pop, push, add, sub, adc, dec, inc, neg, not, mov, sbb, xchg, xor) 
ROP / JOP / COP The gadget contains a non-static assignment to the gadget's value destination register. 
 
 
Table B.2: Side Effects Detected by Gality (Extended Version) and their Associated Scores. 
Attack Category Score Increase Side Effect Description 
ROP 2.0 A data move or arithmetic operation is performed on the stack pointer register. 
ROP 3.0 A shift and rotate operation is performed on the stack pointer register. 
ROP 4.0 The stack pointer register is the target of a move or exchange operation. 
ROP 2.0 Gadget contains a leave instruction. 
ROP 2.0 Cumulative stack pointer offsets in the gadget are negative. 
ROP 1.0 The stack pointer register is the target of a pop operation. 
JOP / COP 2.0 A data move or arithmetic operation is performed on the indirect jump/call target register. 
JOP / COP 3.0 A shift and rotate operation is performed on the indirect jump/call target register. 
JOP / COP 2.0 An exchange operation is performed on the indirect jump/call target register. 
ROP / JOP / COP 2.0 Gadget contains a conditional branch instruction. 
ROP / JOP / COP 1.0 A data move or arithmetic operation is performed on the gadget's value destination register. 
ROP / JOP / COP 1.5 A shift and rotate operation is performed on the gadget's value destination register. 
ROP / JOP / COP 0.5 A data move, arithmetic, or shift and rotate operations is performed on a potential value-carrying register. 
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